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ers are not positively related to a trade‟s likely information content. The paper then highlights three hy-
potheses from the literature – fixed operating costs, market power, and strategic dealing – that may ex-
plain the cross-sectional variation in customers spreads. The paper finishes by proposing a price discovery 
process relevant to liquid two-tier markets and providing preliminary evidence that this process applies to 
currencies. [JEL F31, G14, G15. Keywords: Bid-ask spreads, foreign exchange, asymmetric information, 












Corresponding author: Carol Osler, cosler@brandeis.edu  or Brandeis International Business School, Brandeis Uni-
versity, Mailstop 32, Waltham, MA 02454, USA. Tel. (781) 736-4826. Fax (781) 736-2269. We are deeply grateful 
to the bankers who provided the data and to William Clyde, Pete Eggleston, Keith Henthorn, Valerie Krauss, Peter 
Nielsen, Peter Tordo, and other bankers who discussed dealing with us. Special thanks go to Clyde, Eggleston, and 
Tordo, for reading and commenting on drafts of the paper. We thank, without implicating, Geir Bjønnes, Alain 
Chaboud, Yin-Wong Cheung, Thomas Gehrig, Michael Goldstein, Joel Hasbrouck, Rich Lyons, Albert Menkveld, 
Bruce Mizrach, Anthony Neuberger, Paolo Pasquariello, Tarun Ramadorai, Dagfinn Rime, Erik Theissen, Dan 
Weaver, and participants at the European Finance Association Annual Conference in Zurich, the Second Annual 
Microstructure Conference in Ottawa and at the NBER microstructure meeting for insightful comments.PRICE  DISCOVERY  IN  CURRENCY  MARKETS  
 
This paper examines the price discovery process in currency markets, basing its analysis on the pivotal 
distinction between the customer (end-user) market and the interdealer market. It first provides evidence 
that the price discovery process cannot be based on adverse selection, as postulated in standard equity-
market models, because the spreads dealers quote to their customers are not positively related to a trade‟s 
likely information content. The paper then highlights three factors highlighted in the literature that may 
explain the cross-sectional variation in customers spreads: fixed operating costs, transitory market power, 
and strategic dealing. The paper finishes by proposing an alternative price discovery process for curren-
cies and providing preliminary evidence for that process.  
The dominant model of price discovery focuses on adverse selection between end-users of a finan-
cial asset and their dealers (Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). In a one-tier market, where all 
trades are between end-users and dealers, dealers rationally protect themselves from their better-informed 
customers by quoting a spread (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Equilibrium bid and ask prices should in-
corporate the expected information content of each trade and, in consequence, prices move in the direc-
tion consistent with the end-users‟ information.  
Most foreign exchange microstructure papers draw on adverse selection as their primary interpre-
tive framework. The relevance of this framework was initially suggested in Lyons (1995), which shows 
that trade size and interbank spreads were positively related for a particular dealer in 1992. The implicit 
adoption of adverse selection else where in the literature is clear in Payne (2003), for example, which 
estimates a VAR decomposition of interdealer trades and quotes that he interprets, following Hasbrouck 
(1991), through the lens of adverse selection. Similarly, Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) estimate Easley et 
al.'s (1996, 1997) adverse-selection-based measure of private information on daily customer trade data.  
Our first contribution is to provide evidence indicating that the spreads quoted to foreign exchange 
customers are not driven primarily by dealer efforts to protect themselves from informed customers. Ad-
verse-selection theory predicts that spreads are wider when end-users are most likely informed, such as 
when they undertake large trades (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987), Glosten   2 
(1989)). If dealing is not anonymous, spreads should also be wider for customers that are typically in-
formed. Dealers consider their financial customers – hedge funds and other asset managers – to be fairly 
well informed, on average. They tend to be fairly savvy about the market and many have insights into 
upcoming exchange-rate returns. By contrast, their commercial customers – firms that participate in inter-
national trade – may know little about the market and typically make no effort to anticipate exchange-rate 
returns. Empirical evidence confirms that financial customers are relatively well informed (Frömmel et al. 
(2008); Carpenter and Wang (2003)). Adverse-selection theory thus predicts that financial customers pay 
wider spreads than commercial customers. Using detailed transaction data from a bank in Germany, we 
estimate three models of spread determination: the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, the Madhavan-Smidt 
model (1991), and the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. None of the models support the relevance of 
adverse selection. Customer spreads are not positively related to trade size and are not wider for financial 
customers.   
Our econometric analysis of all three models indicates that customer spreads are widest for the 
trades least likely to be informed, directly contrary to the prediction of adverse-selection theory. We are 
not aware of previous evidence showing narrower spreads for relatively informed customer types though 
a negative relation between trade size and spreads has been documented for the London Stock Exchange 
(Bernhardt et al. (2005)) and the U.S. municipal bond market (Green et al. (2007), Harris and Piwowar 
(2004)). Our second contribution is to analyze the potential determinants of this pattern of customer 
spreads. The literature highlights at least three factors that could drive this pattern. The first, fixed operat-
ing costs, can explain the negative relation between trade size and customer spreads but cannot explain 
variation across customer types. The second is transitory “market power” dealers gain from their infor-
mation about current market conditions (Green et al. (2004)). It can be costly for customers to seek out 
the best quotes, so an individual dealer has market power during the moment of communicating with the 
customer, even in a market with hundreds of competitors. In foreign exchange, this suggests that dealers 
extract wider spreads from commercial than financial customers, since commercial customers are typical-
ly less savvy about the market.    3 
The literature also suggests that dealers strategically vary spreads to optimize information flow, ra-
ther than passively accepting information flow as assumed in adverse-selection models. Building on theo-
retical results in Leach and Madhavan (1992, 1993) and Naik et al. (1999) as well as empirical evidence 
that customer order flow does carry information (e.g., Evans and Lyons (2004), Daníelsson et al. (2002)), 
we suggest that foreign exchange dealers strategically set narrower spreads to informed customers to gain 
information from which to profit in subsequent interdealer trading. 
The paper's third contribution is to outline a process, new to the literature, through which infor-
mation may ultimately become embedded in exchange rates. Our proposed price-discovery mechanism 
focuses on dealers‟ order choice in the interdealer market. After trading with an informed customer, a 
dealer's information and inventories provide strong incentives to unload their inventory, and possibly to 
take a speculative position, by placing market orders or otherwise trading aggressively. An informed-
customer purchase thus tends to trigger aggressive buy trades in the interdealer market and higher in-
terdealer exchange rates. In this way the information brought to the market by informed customers gener-
ates information-consistent changes in interdealer prices. By contrast, after trading with uninformed cus-
tomers a dealer has only weak incentives to place market orders. In short, dealer transactions with unin-
formed customers are likely to generate limit orders and to add liquidity rather than to move the market 
price. 
This view of dealer behavior, which follows directly from insights already in the literature (Harris 
(1998), Foucault (1999), Reiss and Werner (2004)), predicts a number of the key stylized facts in foreign 
exchange microstructure. First, it predicts the positive relation between interdealer order flow and ex-
change-rate returns documented in Lyons (1995), Payne (2003), Evans (2002), Evans and Lyons (2002), 
and Daníelsson et al. (2002), inter alia. If dealers are responding to fundamental information, it also pre-
dicts that the relation should be substantially permanent, consistent with evidence presented in Payne 
(2003), Killeen et al. (2005) and Bjønnes et al. (2005). In addition, our view of dealer behavior predicts 
the positive relation between exchange rates and financial order flow documented in Evans and Lyons 
(2004), Bjønnes et al. (2005), and Marsh and O'Rourke (2005). Finally, our view predicts that the re-
sponse of exchange rates to financial order flow is substantially permanent, consistent with evidence in   4 
Lyons (2001) and Bjønnes and Rime (2005). We test further implications of our proposed price discovery 
mechanism, most notably that dealers should be more likely to make aggressive trades after large finan-
cial-customer trades than after small commercial-customer trades. The evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
The paper‟s microstructure message is directly relevant to the literature on exchange-rate dynamics, 
which is somewhat analogous to the literature on asset pricing within finance. A critical empirical devel-
opment in exchange-rate economics has been the recognition that order flow strongly influences returns 
(Evans and Lyons (2002)). Existing theory shows that order flow matters in part because it carries infor-
mation (e.g., Evans and Lyons (2002), (2004)), but has not articulated the mechanism through which the 
customers‟ information is incorporated into exchange rates. Our proposed price discovery framework 
helps fill this gap. 
Our analysis may also have broader implications within microstructure, since we essentially sug-
gest that the price discovery process in any market depends on the market‟s structure. Since the familiar 
adverse-selection process assumes a one-tier market, it may not be relevant in markets like foreign ex-
change with active interdealer trading. Our proposed price discovery process may, in turn, be relevant to 
other liquid two-tier markets, such as the U.S. Treasury market and the London Stock Exchange. Evi-
dence already shows that the relation between customer spreads and trade size in those markets fits the 
pattern we identify for currency markets. The mechanism we outline differs, however, from the one out-
lined in Dunne et al.‟s (2009) discussion of the euro-sovereign bond market. In their model, all trades are 
the same size and all customers are equally informed, while our analysis focuses on information differ-
ences between different types of customers and trades of different sizes. Presumably this difference re-
flects differences in the importance of asymmetric information across markets. 
Our data comprise the entire USD/EUR transaction record of a single dealer at a bank in Germany 
during four months in 2001. These data have two advantages relative to most other tick-by-tick transac-
tions datasets in foreign exchange: (i) they distinguish between financial and commercial transactions, 
and (ii) they cover a longer time period.   5 
Our analysis builds on extensive empirical evidence showing that information asymmetries exist in 
the foreign exchange market (Evans and Lyons (2005); Rime et al. (2010); Moore and Payne (2009), Phy-
laktis and Chen (2009); Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010)) and that financial-customer trades carry more 
information, on average, than commercial-customer trades (Fan and Lyons (2003), Carpenter and Wang 
(2003); Bjønnes et al. (2008); Frömmel et al. (2008); Menkhoff and Schmeling (2008)). Our data do not 
distinguish among types of financial customers, however, so we do not address the interesting and close-
ly-related issue of whether hedge funds have more information than other asset managers (Osler and 
Vandrovych (2009)). 
The rest of the paper has four sections and a conclusion. Section I describes the foreign exchange 
market and our data. Section II shows that customer spreads in foreign exchange do not conform to the 
predictions of adverse-selection theory. Section III discusses how the observed cross-sectional variation 
in customer spreads may be explained by fixed operating costs, transitory market power, and strategic 
dealing. Section IV articulates our proposed price discovery process and presents supporting evidence. 
Section V concludes. 
I.  FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET STRUCTURE AND DATA   
  As documented in a recent foreign exchange survey (Bank for International Settlements 2007), 
roughly two thousand dealers compete for business in spot, forward, swap, and derivative contracts. Deal-
ers can be found in almost every country so trading takes place round the clock, with roughly half of each 
day‟s trading accounted for by three major trading centers – Tokyo, London, and New York. Trading is 
relatively concentrated across currencies: the euro, which we study here, is involved in almost one fifth of 
all trades. The foreign exchange market – or the “FX” market, as it is called by market participants – is 
immense: daily trading was last formally estimated at $3.2 trillion (Bank for International Settlements 
(2007)). The market is also intensely competitive. Banks compete in terms of spreads and in terms of 
transaction speed, pricing consistency, trading strategies, electronic products, and the quality of customer 
relationships (Euromoney (2007)).   6 
  The market has two segments, or tiers. In the customer market, currency end-users or equivalently 
“customers” trade with dealers in a quote-driven market. In the interdealer market, dealers trade currency 
with each other. End-users include financial firms such as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and 
broker-dealers. They also include firms engaged in international trade, which range from major multina-
tionals to small firms. In contrast to equity markets, where individuals can account for half or more of all 
trading, the overwhelming majority of currency trades are carried out by institutions. FX customer trades 
are priced directly off interbank quotes. A salesperson constructs the quote given to a customer from a 
preliminary quote provided at that moment by an interdealer trader. Those preliminary quotes are in turn 
anchored on the best bid and offer in the interdealer market. In electronic communication networks (e.g., 
Currenext, FXAll) the connection between interdealer prices and customer quotes is programmed directly 
into the pricing algorithm. The spreads quoted to these end users are the focus of Sections II and III. 
  Interdealer trades typically take place on order-driven exchanges, though there is still some direct 
interdealer trading in the quote-driven market. The share of the interdealer market has dropped noticeably 
in recent decades, party due to the increasing dominance of electronic brokerages. Trading is now split 
almost evenly between the interdealer and customer markets (Bank for International Settlements (2007)).
1 
  Our data comprise the complete USD/EUR transaction record of a bank in Germany over the 87 
trading days from 11 July 2001 to 9 November 2001. Like all significant FX dealers, the bank offers the 
full range of FX products, including forwards and derivatives; it serves the full range of customers, in-
cluding financial as well as commercial customers; and it participates in the interdealer market as both 
liquidity provider and liquidity demander. While the bank desires anonymity, we can state that the bank 
was included among the banks rated in Euromoney‟s annual FX poll for 2007, which places it among the 
top ten percent of all dealing banks worldwide. Furthermore, in that same poll the bank was among those 
considered “best” in euro-dollar trading. 
  For each transaction we have the following information: (1) the date and time; (2) the direction 
(counterparty buys or sells); (3) the quantity; (4) the transaction price; (5) the type of counterparty  deal-
                                                            
1 Intraday trading in the major currency pairs is never constrained by supply because banks create deposits. During 
our sample period foreign exchange dealers were effectively the only intraday suppliers of liquidity so there is no 
need to consider “latent liquidity” (Chacko et al. (2006)).   7 
ing bank, financial customer, commercial customer, preferred customer; (6) the initiator; and (7) the for-
ward points if applicable. We infer the dealer‟s inventory by cumulating the entire set of successive trans-
actions. Our analysis relies on transaction time, rather than clock time, and all trades are entered in a strict 
chronological order. The data technically refer to the overall bank, but they are an accurate reflection of a 
single dealer's behavior because only one dealer was responsible for the bank's USD/EUR trading in spot 
and forward markets.  
  Table I provides basic descriptive statistics.
2 The data include over 3,600 trades worth around €4.3 
billion in aggregate. The mean trade size is €1.2 million; the average financial-customer trade, at €2.4 
million, is bigger than the average commercial-customer trade, at €0.8 million. Figure 1 shows the distri-
bution of trades across the trading day. Financial-customer trades (Figure 1A) tend to cluster in the morn-
ing, dropping before lunchtime, while commercial-customer trades (Figure 1B) rise steadily during the 
morning, crest around lunchtime (when they also take a brief, sharp dip), and then decline steadily during 
the afternoon. 
  We include outright forward trades adjusted to a spot-comparable basis by the forward points. This 
is appropriate, given the institutional structure of forward trading: the customer and the dealing bank first 
agree on a spot trade in exactly the same manner, and with exactly the same incentives, as they would for 
regular spot trades. When they later adjust the trade to the appropriate maturity, the associated “forward 
points” are governed by market- and central-bank determined interest differentials so the bank‟s own in-
fluence on the forward price comes almost entirely through the spot quotes. We exclude trades with “pre-
ferred customers,” typically commercial customers with multi-dimensional relationships with the bank, 
because these customers‟ spreads may reflect cross-selling arrangements and because their trades are typ-
ically tiny (average size EUR 0.18 million). We also exclude the few transactions over $25 million, since 
such trades essentially represent a distinct market: customers hire dealers to manage such trades.
3 
  Table II provides information with which to compare our currency dealer with others described in 
the literature. In terms of his daily trading value, average transactions per day, and mean absolute price 
                                                            
2 We exclude a few trades with tiny volumes (less than EUR 1,000) or with apparent typographical errors. 
3 Fewer than ten of the customer trades in our sample exceeded $25 million. These trades were not excluded when 
calculating inventory levels.   8 
change between transactions, our dealer is comparable to a NOK/DEM dealer at the large dealing bank 
examined in Bjønnes and Rime (2005), and more generally our dealer was about average sized for the 
time (Bank for International Settlements (2002)).  
Like all FX dealers, our dealer manages his own inventory (subject to position limits), and quickly 
eliminate inventory accumulated via customer trades. To evaluate the speed with which our dealer elimi-
nates inventory we estimate the following standard regression: 
        It - It-1 =    + It-1 + t.  ,  (1)                               
where time subscripts correspond to transaction time and we include all 3,534 transactions. If the dealer 
instantly eliminates unwanted inventories then   -1; if he makes no effort to manage inventory then   
0. We use GMM with a Newey-West weighting matrix to estimate standard errors that are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The point estimate of  = -0.022 (standard error 0.007) implies a me-
dian inventory half-life around two hours, well below estimated inventory reversion speeds for equities 
which are measured in days (Madhavan and Smidt (1993)) or weeks (Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993)). If 
we apply a common alternative approach to measuring FX inventory positions, in which inventories are 
reset to zero nightly (e.g., Lyons (2001)), median inventory half-life is only 17 minutes. 
  Our dealer‟s customers also behave consistently with those analyzed elsewhere in the literature, 
Cumulative financial- and commercial-customer order flow are both I(1), like the exchange rate itself.
4 In 
addition, as shown in Table III, cumulative financial-customer (commercial-customer) order flow is posi-
tively (negatively) cointegrated with the exchange rate. Qualitatively consistent results are reported in 
three studies of large banks – Lyons (2001), Evans and Lyons (2004), and Marsh and O‟Rourke (2005)  – 
as well as a study based on market-wide data for the Swedish krone (Bjønnes et al. (2005)). This pattern 
is generally interpreted to mean that net commercial customers often respond to price changes induced by 
financial-customer liquidity demand (Bjønnes et al. (2005), Osler (2008)). In effect, since dealers general-
ly end the day with close to zero inventory, the exchange rate must move to induce commercial customers 
to supply overnight liquidity to financial customers. 
                                                            
4 Results suppressed to save space.   9 
  Our main qualitative conclusions should generalize beyond this one dealer because FX is an in-
tensely competitive market: during our sample period the largest dealer had market share of only about 10 
percent. In FX, the product is liquidity and the price is the bid-ask spread. Dealers confirm their limited 
influence over spreads when they claim, in surveys, that their primary consideration is the spreads‟ “con-
ventional level” (Cheung and Chinn (2001)).  
  Our sample period includes September 11, 2001, but that day‟s events do not materially affect our 
conclusions. Despite the extreme disruption of U.S. money, bond, and stock markets, the FX market func-
tioned smoothly overall. Volatility, trading volume, and spreads were high on September 11, 2001 itself, 
as would be expected in an efficient market subject to major news shocks. But volatility and spreads were 
indistinguishable from their normal levels by the next day (Mende (2006)). This resilience no doubt stems 
in part from the large number of dealers and their wide geographical dispersion. In addition, Reuters and 
EBS, the two major electronic brokerages, both have servers in multiple locations around the world per-
forming real-time replication of all functions. 
II.  THE  CROSS-SECTIONAL  PATTERN  OF  CURRENCY  SPREADS 
  This section evaluates whether the cross-sectional pattern of customer spreads in FX is consistent 
with the predictions of adverse selection. The first of these predictions, that large trades will be quoted 
relatively wide spreads, is based on the familiar conclusion that the size of informed trades should vary 
positively with the likely magnitude of the traders‟ anticipated price move (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Easley and O'Hara (1987), Glosten (1989)). Consistent with this, dealers observe that small trades are 
typically less informative than large trades. For example, William Clyde, formerly a trading-floor manag-
er at First Chicago, found that, “Small trades, no matter what the source, do not contain much infor-
mation” (personal communication, August 18, 2004). 
  The second prediction of adverse selection is that financial customers will be quoted wider spreads 
than commercial customers. Dealers claim that, on average, commercial order flow carries less fundamen-
tal information than financial order flow. According to Clyde:    10 
Financial customers tend to get better spreads because their trades reflect their view of the market, 
and their views are often shared with other asset managers. … With corporates you're just seeing 
their core business activities – car building or whatever. Almost all of them will tell you “we're not 
in the business of speculating.” 
Empirical support for the claim that financial customers are better informed is presented in Carpenter and 
Wang (2003), which finds that dealers widen their spreads after transactions with financial customers but 
leave spreads unchanged after transactions with commercial customers. This may seem counterintuitive if 
one envisages commercial-firm trades as dominated by capital issues or a market-sensitive hedging strat-
egy. But the vast majority of commercial trades have no connection to capital events, reflecting instead 
mundane real-side concerns like a firm‟s need to import inputs, and hedging strategies are typically re-
vised at most a few times yearly.  
  Support for this claim also comes from Osler and Vandrovych (2009), who examine the infor-
mation content of price-contingent trades from different customer types. They find that hedge-fund trades 
carry information but there is no information in the trades of institutional asset managers, broker dealers, 
large and middle market corporations, and governments. Fan and Lyons (2003) suggest that financial-
customer order flow carries information relevant to high-frequency exchange-rate dynamics while non-
financial order flow is more strongly related to multi-year dynamics. As dealers tell us in surveys, they 
only care about the short-run information (Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004), Oberlechner (2004)), a claim 
that fits their tendency to carry zero inventory overnight. Additional evidence that financial-customer 
trades provide information about short-run exchange rates is provided in Froot and Ramadorai (2005).  
  We estimate three familiar models of spreads: the Huang and Stoll model (1997), the Madhavan 
and Smidt model (1991), and the Glosten and Harris model (1988), all of which extract measures of 
spreads from successive price changes. In a simple market where the spread is constant across time and 
across customers, if the equilibrium price is stable prices only change when they switch from bid to ask or 
vice versa so the spread can be estimated from price changes. In the absence of price stability, the same 
conclusion still applies so long as there is no dominant trend.   11 
A.  The Huang and Stoll Model 
  Huang and Stoll (1997) observe that trade size is relatively unimportant for pricing in markets – 
like the FX interbank market – where large trades are routinely broken up into multiple smaller transac-
tions. Even in such markets, however, the risk of trading with a better informed counterparty remains. 
Huang and Stoll's model of a standard competitive dealership market analyzes the pricing decision of a 
representative dealer whose counterparties have private information that is revealed by their trade direc-
tion (buy or sell). Agents are fully rational. The model assumes that dealer i‟s quote is determined by the 
dealer‟s expected true value of the asset, it, the trade's direction, and the dealer‟s existing inventory: 




P        
*
2 2
  .      (2)  
  The baseline half-spread – meaning the spread that would apply before adjustment for existing in-
ventories – is S/2. Dt is the direction of trade [Dt ≡  1 (-1) if the counterparty is a buyer (seller)]. Iit is deal-
er i's inventory at the beginning of period t; I*i is his desired inventory. The model permits dealers to 
manage existing inventories by shading prices to customers (e.g., quoting lower prices when inventory is 
high), which implies  > 0. The term t  is a mean-zero random disturbance. 
  Dealer i updates his expectation of the asset's fundamental value in light of the private information 
revealed by the direction of the previous trade as well as public news, t: it – it-1 = (S/2)Dt-1 + t. The 
term S/2 captures the information effect of trade direction and is a direct manifestation of adverse selec-
tion. The public news shock, t, is a serially uncorrelated. Combining the pricing and updating rules gives 
the following expression for price changes between transactions: 
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2
1 1   ,  (3) 
where et ≡  t + t . Pt  ≡ Pt  - Pt-1  is measured in pips, which are roughly equivalent to basis points.
5 
  Estimation: Our dependent variable is the sequence of prices on transactions initiated by customers, 
so our econometric analysis once again operates on transaction time rather than clock time. We include 
                                                            
5 A pip is equivalent to a tick: one unit of the smallest significant digit in an exchange rate as conventionally quoted. 
In the euro-dollar market, where the exchange rate averaged $1.1128/€ during our sample period; a one-pip change 
from that level would bring the rate to $1.1129/€.    12 
almost all trades by all customers. We follow standard practice and use generalized method of moments 
(GMM) with a Newey-West weighting matrix that corrects covariance estimates for potential heteroske-
dasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals (e.g., Yao (1998), Bjønnes and Rime (2005)). 
We follow Huang and Stoll (1997) in estimating separate coefficients for trades in various size and 
customer-type categories, which we achieve by interacting the key right-hand-side variables with dum-
mies for transaction size {Sm, Md, Lg} and counterparty type {FC, CC}. Dealers report that they infor-
mally divide normal-sized customer transactions into three categories: regular trades, which vary from €1 
million to about €25 million; modest trades; and tiny trades. Though the line between the latter two cate-
gories is ambiguous, their treatment can vary substantially: tiny trades are often spread by formula rather 
than by dealers' discretion and on such trades a one percent spread is not considered unreasonable. We 
therefore assign the following size ranges: small trades: {|Qt|  (€0, € 0.5 million)}; large trades: {|Qt|  
[€1 million, € 25 million)}; and medium trades: {|Qt|  [€0.5 million, €1 million)}. Table IV provides 
descriptive statistics on the key variables, specifically trade sizes, returns, inventory, and order flow dis-
aggregated by customer type. 
According to correspondents at large dealing banks, the correct customer disaggregation is between 
small commercial customers, on the one hand, and financial customers and large multinational (commer-
cial) corporations, on the other. Though we cannot technically distinguish large multinationals from other 
commercial customers, large multinationals are unlikely to do much business with this bank. Thus the 
counterparty-based tiering identified here should be roughly accurate in the present context.   
  The results of estimating the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown in Table V, provide no sup-
port for the implications of adverse selection. Adverse selection would imply that baseline half-spreads 
are positively related to trade size, but the opposite appears to hold: estimated baseline half-spreads for 
financial customers are 10.8 pips for small trades, 5.4 pips for medium-sized trades, and 3.4 pips for large 
trades. Chi-squared statistics from the associated Wald tests highlight that spreads do indeed vary inverse-
ly with trade size: for the small-vs.-medium comparison the test statistic is 4.06 with marginal signifi-
cance 0.044; for the small-vs.-large comparison the test statistic is 6.10 with marginal significance 0.014. 
For commercial customers, estimated baseline half-spreads are 13.5 pips for small trades, 11.2 pips for   13 
medium-sized trades, and 2.1 pips for large trades, and the inverse relation between trade size and spreads 
is again confirmed statistically. Chi-squared statistic from the Wald test for the small-vs.-large compari-
son is 46.1 with marginal significance 0.000; for the medium-vs.-large comparison the test statistic is 8.81 
with marginal significance 0.003. 
  Adverse selection would also imply that financial customers are quoted wider spreads than com-
mercial customers. The point estimates for baseline half-spreads provide no evidence to support this im-
plication, either. Indeed, commercial customers are quoted wider spreads for both small and medium 
trades and the difference is statistically significant for the medium-sized trades (Chi-squared statistic of 
4.01 has marginal significance of 0.045). For large trades the estimated baseline half-spread is insignifi-
cant for both customer types. 
  Adverse selection also fails to get support from the estimated adverse-selection coefficients, . Ad-
verse selection theory predicts a positive relation between this parameter and information content but the 
point estimates imply the opposite for commercial traders. Further, though large financial trades are con-
sidered most informed, the one significant value of  applies to medium-sized commercial trades. Finally, 
adverse selection gets no support from the coefficients on the quantity traded, which should be positive 
under the theory. This hypothesis is readily rejected by the chi-squared statistic for the exclusion of these 
six coefficients, 9.746 (marginal significance 0.14).  
  The results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model also suggest that inventory levels are not relevant 
to FX customer spreads, since none of the six inventory coefficients is significant. Formal exclusion tests 
confirm that inventories are not significant (chi-squared statistic is 3.64 with marginal significance 0.72). 
Similar results have been found for other banks examined in the literature, which has led to a broad con-
sensus that FX dealers prefer managing inventory via interbank trades rather than by shading prices to 
customers (Bjønnes and Rime (2005)).  
Table V presents three further robustness tests, all of which support the qualitative conclusions out-
lined above. In the first we rerun the regression with inventories calculated as in Lyons (2001), where the 
start value is reset to zero every day. In the second regression we include interdealer as well as customer 
trades to provide comparability with Bjønnes and Rime (2005), where customer transactions (as a single   14 
category) and interbank transactions are included in the main regressions. Reassuringly, our bank‟s base-
line half-spread for normal-sized interbank transactions, 2.1 pips, is similar to those estimated for other 
banks; for example, Goodhart et al. (2002) finds an average spread of 2.8 pips for USD/EUR interbank 
transactions. In the third robustness test we include spot transactions, which also facilitates comparisons 
with earlier papers.  
Our conclusion that adverse selection does not dominate the determination of customer spreads in 
the FX market is also robust to the following additional unreported methodological modifications: exclud-
ing data for September 11, 2001; using a different cutoff to distinguish between small and medium trades 
(€300,000 rather than €500,000); and including additional lags of the dependent variable, with lag length 
of two suggested consistently by the Akaike information criterion and other standard tests.  
B.  The Madhavan and Smidt Model 
  FX dealers consistently report that they consider large customer trades to be more informative than 
small ones, so the Huang and Stoll (1997) model‟s assumption that trade size is uninformative may be 
inappropriate. Trade size is informative in the Madhavan and Smidt model (1991), which has frequently 
been applied in FX microstructure research (see, for example, Lyons (1995) and Bjønnes and Rime 
(2005)). In this model, agent j calls dealer i requesting a quote and chooses an amount Qjt that is positive-
ly related to the gap between his expected value of the asset, jt, and the price quoted by the dealer: 
jt it jt jt X P Q    ) (  , where  > 0.  Xjt represents agent j's liquidity demand. In setting his regret-free 
price, Pit, dealer i considers his own expected value of the asset, jt, his inventory, and the direction of the 
trade: t i it it it D I I P        ) (
* . In determining j, dealer i rationally considers customer‟s desired 
trade size. If the dealer shades prices to manage existing inventories,  < 0.  
  After solving for conditional expectations and taking first differences, one arrives at the following 
expression for the price change between dealer i‟s incoming transactions: 
           t jt it it t t it Q I I D D P                  1 2 1 1 2 1   (4)   15 
The intercept, , should be zero if the dealer‟s desired inventory is zero. If the dealer shades prices in 
response to inventories then2  > | 1| > 0 >  1. Our estimates of the Huang and Stoll model suggest that 
both  1 and 2 will be about zero. 
  Adverse selection, if operative, could influence three parameters in this model. First, it could influ-
ence  2, the coefficient on lagged direction, which according to the model is the negative of the baseline 
half-spread. Under adverse selection this would be bigger (in absolute value) for large trades and for fi-
nancial-customer trades. This same effect could also be reflected in the coefficient on trade size: under 
adverse selection this coefficient should be positive. Large trades can reflect a big gap between the asset‟s 
true value and the dealer‟s quote, so a rational dealer in the model increases the spread with trade size. 
Unfortunately, the interpretation of a positive coefficient on trade size is inherently ambiguous, since it is 
observationally equivalent to an inventory effect highlighted in Ho and Stoll (1981): Larger trades leave 
dealers with higher inventory and greater inventory risk, so larger trades should carry wider spreads. 
  Finally, adverse selection should influence the relation between 1 and  2. The model implies that 
1 = | 2|/  > 0 >  2, where 0 <  < 1 is a model-derived parameter capturing the extent to which dealers 
rely on their priors rather than the current trade in updating their estimate of the currency‟s true value. 
Under adverse selection, estimates of  should be farther below unity for large trades and for financial 
trades, since dealers consider such trades to be relatively informative. 
As before, we estimate the model using generalized method of moments (GMM) with Newey-West 
correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and we interact the key variables with dummies cor-
responding to trade size and counterparty type.
 6 The results of this analysis, presented in Table VI, tell 
the same story as the Huang and Stoll (1997) regressions. The estimated baseline half-spreads do not vary 
positively with the likely information content of each trade as predicted by adverse selection theory. For 
financial customers, the estimated baseline half-spreads are a statistically-significant 8.9 pips on small 
trades and roughly one-third that size – and insignificantly different from zero – for medium and large 
                                                            
6 Co-linearity among our instruments is unlikely to be a problem, since the only pair of instruments with non-trivial 
correlation is Fin x Qt and Fin x LG x Dt, and the qualitative conclusions from our baseline analysis are sustained 
when quantity variables are excluded.   16 
trades. Commercial customer half-spreads are estimated to be 13.2 pips on small trades, 5.7 pips for me-
dium trades, and essentially zero for large trades. In this regression the small-vs.-large distinction for fi-
nancial customers and all size distinctions for commercial customers are statistically significant but dif-
ferences across counterparty types are not; the counterparty differences become significant, however, 
when we exclude the inventory and quantity variables which are jointly insignificant as discussed below.
7 
The other two potential sources of evidence for adverse selection are equally unsupportive. The 
theory implies that the coefficient on trade size, , should be positive, but it is only positive for commer-
cial customers and it is statistically insignificant for both customer types. Theory also implies that the 
ratio between the coefficients on lagged and current direction, = | 2|/1, should vary negatively with 
trade size. Instead this ratio varies non-monotonically with trade size for the financial customers, the cus-
tomers to which the theory most likely applies: for small, medium, and large financial trades the point 
estimates are 0.67, 0.99, and 0.66, respectively. Similarly, though adverse selection predicts smaller val-
ues of  for financial than commercial customers, the estimates of for medium and large commercial-
customer trades are both below corresponding estimates for financial customers.  
The other results from this model are unsurprising. The constant term is insignificant, implying that 
our dealer‟s preferred inventory level is indeed about zero. The chi-squared test for the exclusion of in-
ventories and the trade quantity is 3.36 with marginal significance 0.34, indicating that inventories and the 
trade quantity itself are jointly insignificant, consistent with our previous results. The results are robust to 
the following modifications to our baseline methodology, the first three of which are reported in Table 
VI: calculating inventories with a daily starting value of zero; including interbank trades; excluding for-
ward transactions; excluding September 11, 2001; including two lags of the dependent variable as sug-
gested by the Aikake information criterion; or splitting small and medium trades at €300,000 rather than 
€500,000. 
C.  The Glosten and Harris Model 
  Glosten and Harris (1988) postulate a model in which inventories play no role; since the inventory 
coefficients have consistently been insignificant, this may be appropriate. Otherwise the Glosten-Harris 
                                                            
7 Results available upon request.   17 
model is similar to the Madhavan-Shmidt (1991) model except that trade size influences the baseline 
spread as well as the adverse-selection component. The price set by a market-maker is Pit = it + (c0 + 
c1Vt)Dt , where Vt  is the (absolute value of the) quantity traded and (c0 + c1Vt) is the baseline half-spread. 
The expected value of the asset is the previous period‟s expected value of the asset adjusted for the size of 
the customer‟s desired trade, which captures adverse selection, and by public news: it = it-1 + zDtVt + t.
8 
The period-t price change is: 
    Pt = c0(Dt – Dt-1) + c1(DtVt – Dt-1Vt-1) + zDtVt + t.            (5)  
The term c0 should capture fixed effects associated with trading, while the term c1 should capture any 
relation between trade size and spreads that is not associated with adverse selection. The term z should be 
positive if it captures adverse selection effects as implied by the model. 
  The results of this analysis, shown in Table VII, provide no more support for adverse-selection than 
our previous results. The adverse-selection coefficients are consistently insignificant and the hypothesis 
that they are jointly insignificant is not rejected (F-statistic 1.18, marginal significance 0.31). In addition, 
the baseline spreads for commercial customers are significantly larger than those for financial customers. 
Indeed, while we can reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same (F-statistic 18.64, mar-
ginal significance 0.00), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the commercial-customer coefficient is twice 
the financial-customer coefficient (F-statistic 0.05, marginal significance 0.42). This is inconsistent with 
adverse-selection theory since financial customers are considered better informed, but it confirms our 
earlier findings. The results also confirm our earlier empirical finding that trade size and baseline spreads 
are inversely related: the estimated values of c1 are negative and significant for both commercial and fi-
nancial customers. When, as before, we re-run the regressions including interbank trades or excluding 
forward trades, our qualitative conclusions are sustained. 
                                                            
8 We estimate the more general version of the two estimated by Glosten and Harris (their Equation 6). Note also that 
since the tick-size in foreign exchange is extremely small (less than 1 basis point), we incorporate rounding errors 
into the disturbance.    18 
D.  Discussion 
  This section has provided evidence that price discovery in FX does not follow the standard adverse 
selection model. Dealers do not appear to adjust customer spreads to protect themselves against the likely 
information content of customer trades. Indeed, our analysis suggests a very specific pattern for the cross-
sectional pattern of FX customer spreads that is the opposite of that predicted by adverse selection: 
spreads are widest for the smallest trades and for the least informed customers.
9 
While our results indicate that adverse selection does not dominate FX customer spreads, they do 
not prove that adverse selection has zero influence on customer spreads. Note also that these results apply 
to the customer FX market. Quoted interdealer spreads should be invariant to counterparty type, since 
most interdealer trades benefit from pre-trade anonymity. 
Adverse selection successfully explains the relation between spreads and trade size on the NYSE 
(see, for example, Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Bernhardt and Hughson (2002), Peterson and Sirri 
(2003)). Not only are NYSE spreads wider for larger trades, but some stock brokers pay for order flow 
from retail (uninformed) customers (Easley et al. (1996)). The theory also works well in explaining the 
pattern of price discrimination among specialists on the non-anonymous Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(Theissen (2003)). There are, however, a number of other markets where adverse selection cannot explain 
the behavior of customer spreads. A negative relationship between spreads and trade size has been docu-
mented in the U.S. corporate bond market (Goldstein et al. (2007)) and the London Stock Exchange 
(Hansch et al. (1999), Bernhardt et al. (2005)). A negative relationship between trade size and spreads has 
also been observed in the relatively illiquid U.S. municipal bond market, where spreads average 2.23 per-
cent for small trades and 0.10 percent for large trades (Harris and Piwowar (2004)). 
The results in this section do not, unfortunately, point to specific alternative determinants of FX 
customer spreads beyond adverse selection. Nonetheless, a number of hypotheses have been suggested in 
the broader microstructure literature that are consistent with the patterns documented above. 
                                                            
9 Spreads on commercial trades have narrowed since 2001 due to the enhanced transparency associated with new 
electronic communication networks.   19 
III.  OPERATING  COSTS,  MARKET  POWER,  AND  STRATEGIC  DEALING 
This section highlights three factors that could drive the pattern of FX customer spreads highlighted 
above: fixed operating costs, transitory market power, and strategic dealing. 
A.  Fixed Operating Costs 
Per-unit processing costs become smaller as trade size gets larger, a point stressed by Angel (1996) 
and Hansch et al. (1999) as a potential source of the inverse relationship between spreads and trade size 
on the London Stock Exchange. While this also seems likely to help explain the negative relation between 
spreads and trade size in the FX customer market, it is unlikely to explain the gap between spreads paid 
by financial and commercial customers. Fixed costs do not vary strongly by customer type and marginal 
costs are, if anything, higher for asset managers, who often require their trade proceeds to be split among 
numerous individual funds. 
One might wonder whether the difference between financial- and commercial-customer spreads re-
flects a difference in the timing of the two groups‟ trades.  Though there are differences in the timing of 
financial and commercial trades, as noted in Section I, interdealer spreads in euro-dollar are fairly con-
stant at low levels throughout our bank‟s regular trading hours (Ito and Hashimoto (2006)). In conse-
quence, intraday trading patterns cannot predict the observed variation in customer spreads. 
The rest of this section highlights two mutually consistent theories of dealing under asymmetric in-
formation that might explain why FX spreads vary across counterparty types. One theory suggests that 
information about current market conditions provides dealers with transitory market power relative to 
uninformed customers, allowing dealers to charge wider spreads. The other theory suggests that dealers 
strategically vary spreads across customers in an attempt to gather private information.
10 These infor-
mation-based forces are mutually consistent and we hypothesize that they operate simultaneously with 
fixed operating costs. The theories we highlight in this section do not exhaust the long list of factors deal-
ers consider in setting spreads – though a longer list of theories could exhaust the patience of our readers. 
                                                            
10 Huang and Stoll (1997) propose an explanation for the negative relationship between adverse selection costs and 
transaction size in equity market spreads but it concerns block trades, which do not exist in foreign exchange.   20 
B.  Market Power 
  Green et al. (2007) point out that dealership markets are opaque due to the dispersion of trading, so 
current market conditions – meaning real-time mid-quotes, spreads, volatility and the like – can be hard to 
ascertain. Asymmetric information about these conditions effectively creates bargaining power. As Angel 
(1996) describes it, “a dealer knows that an unsophisticated individual … may have higher search costs 
per share and is not in a good position to monitor the quality of a broker's execution. The broker has little 
incentive to spend time negotiating or shopping around for a better deal for a small order. Thus, a dealer 
may take advantage of this by quoting a wider market…” (p. 4). Duffie et al. (2004) develop this insight 
and related insights into a formal model and show that bargaining power in dealership markets partly re-
flects the alternatives to trading immediately, alternatives that are influenced by the costs and benefits of 
further search. 
This “market-power” hypothesis can be applied directly to explain why commercial FX customers 
pay wider spreads than financial customers. Currencies are traded in dealership markets with dispersed 
information, and dealers consider commercial customers less sophisticated than financial customers. 
Commercial firms typically trade currencies in order to purchase imports necessary for production or to 
liquidate export proceeds. Since the firms‟ currency transactions are scattered across time and often 
across currencies, the firms do not hire professional traders. Instead, they assign FX trading to administra-
tors with many other responsibilities. Because they trade infrequently it is difficult for these individuals to 
gain an intuitive understanding of the market, a difficulty often compounded by lack of real-time market 
information. Further, these individuals are rarely evaluated on execution quality, so they have no incen-
tive to achieve better spreads. In short, traders at commercial firms perceive high costs to search and low 
benefits, making them ripe targets for wide spreads. 
FX traders at financial firms, who are often professionals, perceive lower costs and greater benefits 
to search because they have plenty of real-time information and are often evaluated on their execution 
quality. Financial firms may also gain market power from their tendency to undertake large trades (see 
Table I). As shown in Bernhardt et al. (2005), customers who regularly trade substantial amounts may 
receive better spreads as dealers compete for their business.   21 
C.  Strategic Dealing 
  The gap between commercial and financial spreads may also reflect strategic dealing: that is, deal-
ers may adjust their pricing so as to extract private information from customer trades. The importance of 
gathering information from customers is indicated by the following comments of William Clyde, the for-
mer trading-floor manager:  
Banks will want to make good quotes on large, potentially information-bearing amounts for two 
reasons. First, it gets them better access to the current information: in addition to getting the direc-
tional information won by being dealt on, the caller will sometimes share a little additional infor-
mation with the bank. With this information you don't get caught out and you can make better trad-
ing decisions. Second, it ensures that institutions with large amounts continue to call whenever they 
have something going on.  
Evidence that the order flow of large currency dealing banks includes information about upcoming high-
frequency currency returns is provided in Daníelsson et al. (2002), Evans and Lyons (2006), and Rime et 
al. (2009). The two-tier structure of FX makes it logical for FX dealers try to capture informative custom-
er order flow, since they can exploit the information in subsequent interdealer trading.
11 Bjønnes et al. 
(2008) provides evidence that even the interbank trades of relatively small banks do carry information, on 
average, though they carry less information than the trades of big banks. 
  The insight that market makers might strategically manipulate spreads to increase the information 
value of order flow was originally explored in Leach and Madhavan (1992, 1993). Those papers use equi-
ty-market inspired models to demonstrate that market makers in one-tier markets may adjust prices early 
in a trading session to enhance later profitability. Flood et al. (1999) present evidence for this type of stra-
tegic dealing in an experimental market similar to the FX interdealer market. Our evidence, however, 
concerns cross-sectional variation in spreads rather than variation across time. Naik et al. (1999) presents 
an equity-inspired model of strategic dealing in a two-tier market in which some customers are relatively 
well informed. They conclude that customer spreads will be narrower for more informed customers, con-
sistent with the pattern we document for FX. Hansch and Neuberger (1997) present evidence consistent 
with this type of strategic dealing on the London Stock Exchange. 
                                                            
11 Strategic dealing may be more relevant in FX than the municipal or corporate bond markets, since most such 
bonds trade relatively infrequently so the information value of any trade may be negligible.   22 
  Our bank‟s order flow need not be hugely informative for strategic dealing considerations to influ-
ence its customer spreads. Since dealers are largely price takers with respect to spreads (Cheung and 
Chinn (2001)), strategic dealing will indirectly influence spreads at moderate-sized banks so long as it 
directly influences spreads at the largest banks.
12 
  Evidence for strategic dealing in FX is presented in Ramadorai (2008), who analyzes the transac-
tions of asset managers and finds that spreads are narrower for managers that produce higher (risk-
adjusted) FX returns. Reitz et al. (2009) provide evidence for the broader claim, implied by both the mar-
ket power and the strategic dealing hypotheses, that financial customers have more bargaining power than 
commercial customers vis-à-vis their dealers. 
IV.  PRICE  DISCOVERY  IN  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE 
The evidence presented here suggests that spreads in the FX customer market are not positively re-
lated to a trade‟s information content, as implied by adverse selection. Indeed, when a customer comes to 
the market with information the price he pays moves less than it would for an uninformed customer. But 
if adverse selection is not the basis for price discovery in currency markets, what is? This section propos-
es an alternative price discovery mechanism for FX and provides evidence consistent with that mecha-
nism. Our proposed mechanism reflects the FX market‟s two-tiered structure. We hypothesize that price 
discovery happens in the interbank market but that much, possibly all the market-relevant information is 
brought to the market by customers.  
According to our proposed price discovery mechanism, the sequence through which information 
moves from customers to market prices involves three stages. In the first stage, dealers trade with custom-
ers but information brought to the market by informed customers does not move prices. In the second 
stage, the information moves prices in the interdealer market when dealers trade with each other, but cus-
tomer prices remain unaffected. The information finally affects customer prices thereafter when dealers 
trade with more customers. 
                                                            
12 This pre-occupation with standard practice may bring to mind the issues of collusion on the NASDAQ raised in 
Christie and Schultz (1994). However, there are literally hundreds of dealers in the major currency pairs, and they 
are spread across the globe; it seems unlikely that collusion could maintain FX spreads for decades.   23 
Because this mechanism involves many stages, any formalization of it awaits the resolution of 
technical constraints in the literature. The dynamics of limit-order markets with asymmetric information 
are so complex that financial models have just begun to yield closed-form solutions. But the complexities 
of our hypothesis exceed even these, since it involves the interaction of an order-driven (interdealer) mar-
ket with a quote-driven (customer) market, both under asymmetric information. Fortunately, all the key 
conceptual elements of our proposed mechanism have been articulated in the literature: our contribution is 
to articulate a synthesis appropriate for the FX context. 
A.  The Mechanism 
This section describes in greater detail the three stages of our proposed price discovery mechanism. 
In stage one, an informed customer contacts his dealer to trade. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985), this cus-
tomer, like any other, would pay a spread that incorporates the trade‟s expected information content. 
Since customer trades are not anonymous, in a Glosten and Milgrom setting the informed customer would 
pay a relatively wide spread and the trades of informed customers would move the market more, on aver-
age, than the trades of uninformed customers. In this way, prices paid in the customer market would im-
mediately reflect their information. Our evidence indicates, however, that for a given market mid-quote 
informed customers transact at prices that move the market less than those of uninformed customers. This 
implies, importantly, that a customer‟s market-relevant information is not immediately and directly im-
pounded in customer prices. 
In stage two of our proposed price discovery mechanism, a customer‟s information influences the 
interdealer price. The dealer infers some or all of the customer‟s information and uses that information to 
guide his own trades. Consider a dealer whose inventory begins at zero and then rises abruptly in response 
to a customer decision to sell. Interdealer markets are crucially important for inventory management in 
FX (Lyons (1995)) as in other two-tier markets (Manaster and Mann (1996), Reiss and Werner (1998)). 
Since FX dealers prefer to have zero inventory, this dealer will most likely try to offload the new invento-
ry to another dealer. As described in Section I, dealers can trade through interdealer brokers or they can 
trade directly. Our analysis carries through regardless of this choice, as described below.   24 
Suppose our dealer trades through the brokers, in which case he submits either a market sell or a 
limit sell. Harris (1998) and Foucault (1999) highlight a central trade-off: market orders provide immedi-
ate execution with certainty while limit orders provide better prices but uncertain execution. We argue 
that this choice will depend on the nature of the customer, since customer trades are not anonymous 
(Reiss and Werner (1998)), and the size of the trade. 
  If the customer is considered informed the dealer has three incentives to exploit the immediacy 
offered by market orders: (i) he has information and might rationally speculate, other things equal; (ii) he 
has inventory with its inherent risk; and (iii) his information indicates that his inventory could soon bring 
a loss. Our dealer therefore seems likely to place a market sell order and earn the lower bid price, for an 
amount that could exceed the new inventory if the dealer chooses to open a speculative position. The 
dealer‟s market sell will bring a lower price. The structure of the interdealer market itself matches in criti-
cal respects the one analyzed in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), so regret-free interbank prices should re-
flect the dealer‟s information. 
  Suppose instead the customer is uninformed. In this case the dealer has only one incentive to place 
a market order: the inherent riskiness of his inventory. Our dealer might be more likely to place a limit 
order which, if executed, would earn him the higher offer price. The limit order would provide liquidity to 
the market rather than move the price. In short, we suggest that dealers have a stronger tendency to place 
market orders after informed customer trades than after uninformed customer trades.
13 The connection to 
price discovery is direct: brokered interdealer prices will therefore tend to move in the direction indicated 
by informed trades.
14  
If our dealer chooses to trade in the over-the-counter market, this analysis changes only superficial-
ly. Calling another dealer, like placing a market order, produces a quick, certain trade at a relatively unde-
sirable price; waiting for someone else to call, like placing a limit order, could bring a better price but 
                                                            
13 The choice between limit and market orders will also hinge on market conditions, such as the width of the bid-ask 
spread and the depth of the book (Biais et al. (1995), Goettler et al. (2005), Lo and Sapp (2005)). 
14 Our conclusion that dealers will place outgoing/market orders after trading with informed customers is consistent 
with the finding of Bloomfield et al. (2005) that informed traders provide liquidity when the value of their infor-
mation is high (low). In their experimental setting information is most valuable when it is new. In FX markets, in-
formation is newest right after a dealer trades with an informed customer, which corresponds to the time we suggest 
the dealer will place the outgoing/market order.   25 
could instead bring no trade at all. A dealer has strong incentives to call another dealer after buying from 
an informed customer, in which case he sells at the lower bid price. After trading with an uninformed 
customer the dealer is more likely to wait for incoming calls and the price is less likely to fall. 
We have so far outlined the first two stages of our proposed price discovery mechanism. Events in 
the third stage, during which market-relevant information influences customer prices, are dictated by the 
market‟s institutional structure. Since foreign-exchange customer trades are priced directly off interbank 
quotes (as outlined in Section I), once the interdealer quotes reflect the new market-relevant information 
subsequent trades will reflect that information as well. This applies to all customer trades with any dealer. 
The price discovery mechanism just outlined could conceivably lead to a no-trade equilibrium in 
the interdealer market if (i) customer identity were the only factor determining whether a dealer makes an 
outgoing trade and (ii) customer identity were a reliable indicator of whether the customer is informed at 
a given point in time. In this case all market orders would be placed by dealers with information, so unin-
formed dealers would always be at an informational disadvantage when placing limit orders and trading 
would cease. These conditions do not hold, however. The literature identifies many factors besides infor-
mation that influence order choice, and these have been shown to influence FX dealers (Menkhoff et al. 
2010). Furthermore, customer identity is imperfectly correlated with a customer‟s private information. 
It is helpful to distinguish the price discovery mechanism postulated here from the one outlined in 
Glosten and Milgrom„s (1985) sequential trade model. Like the Glosten and Milgrom process, ours 
incorporates a sequence of individual customer trades of which a subset carries information. But in FX, 
dealers know each customer‟s identity and they know which customers tend to be informed. In addition, 
FX dealers have access to an interbank market. Price discovery in FX thus involves two sequences: the 
sequence of individual customer trades and the sequence through which each bit of information moves 
prices in the delaer and customer markets. When an informed FX customer trades with his dealing bank, 
the customer price does not immediately move to reflect that information, contrary to the Glosten and 
Milgrom framework, because the dealer quotes informed customers relatively narrow spreads. The 
customer‟s information impacts market prices in stage two, when the dealer extracts information from the 
customer‟s trade and uses that information in his own trading. The customer‟s information finally reaches   26 
the customer market in stage three, when new customer prices throughout the market are based on the 
new interdealer prices. 
B.  Explaining the Stylized Facts 
This proposed price discovery mechanism predicts a number of the stylized facts in FX microstruc-
ture. For example, it predicts that the relatively-informed financial order flow will be positively related to 
exchange-rate returns. Evidence for such a relationship is provided in Evans and Lyons (2004), Bjønnes 
et al. (2005), and Marsh and O'Rourke (2005). If the information in question is fundamental, then our 
analysis also predicts that this relationship between financial order flow and exchange rates is substantial-
ly permanent, evidence for which is provided in Lyons (2001) and in Bjønnes et al. (2008). 
This proposed price discovery mechanism also predicts a positive and largely permanent relation-
ship between exchange rates and interdealer order flow. (In the order-driven or brokered portion of the 
interdealer market order flow is market buy orders minus market sell orders; in the quote-driven or direct 
dealing portion of that market the initiator is the dealer that calls out.) Consistent with this prediction, 
substantial evidence indicates a strong and positive contemporaneous correlation between interdealer or-
der flow and exchange-rate returns at the daily and weekly horizons (see Lyons (1995), Evans (2002), 
Evans and Lyons (2002), Daníelsson et al. (2003), Payne (2003) and Killeen et al. (2005), inter alia). Fur-
thermore, a substantial portion of this relationship is permanent (Evans and Lyons (2002), Payne (2003), 
Killeen et al. (2005), Bjønnes et al. (2005)). 
  This proposed price discovery mechanism also answers a natural question regarding the strategic 
dealing hypothesis: If dealers quote narrower spreads to attract informed customers, how do the dealers 
benefit from that information? We answer: they benefit via enhanced interdealer trading. The information 
permits them to reduce their inventory risk and/or to take speculative positions based on the information.  
C.  Additional Evidence 
Our proposed price discovery mechanism has four additional testable implications. First, it predicts 
that interdealer prices are the best measure of “the market” at any instant. Abundant institutional evidence 
confirms this implication. Most critically, dealers universally base their customer quotes on the interdeal-  27 
er market‟s current best bid and offer, as described in Section I. Second, our proposed price discovery 
mechanism predicts that dealers with the most customers should be best informed and should profit the 
most from interdealer trading, consistent with the finding in Bjønnes et al. (2008) that large-bank trades 
have greater predictive power for returns than small-bank trades.  
The third and fourth testable implications of our proposed price discovery mechanism concern the 
likelihood of outgoing interbank transactions. Under our proposed price discovery mechanism, dealers 
should be more likely to place interdealer market orders after trades with financial customers than after 
trades with commercial customers. Similarly, dealers should be more likely to place interdealer market 
orders after larger trades than after small ones, even after controlling for inventory. If our hypothesis is 
incorrect and information from individual customers is not critical to the dealers‟ make or take decisions, 
then customer type and trade size should not matter once we control for the dealer‟s inventory level and 
other relevant factors. 
We test these last two implications via a probit analysis of the conditional probability that a given 
transaction is outgoing in the interbank market: 
    Prob(Tradet=IB
out) = P(FCt-1, CCt-1, 10miot-1,|Iit|, Iit
2, |Qjt|)  .  (5a) 
Our hypothesis concerns the first three variables: dummy variables indicating that the previous trade was 
with a financial customer, FC t-1, or with a commercial customer trades, CCt-1, and a dummy set to one if 
the previous transaction was worth €10 million or more, 10miot-1. Our conjecture suggests that the coeffi-
cient on the financial dummy will be higher than the coefficient on commercial dummy and the coeffi-
cient on 10miot-1 will be positive.  
  The last three terms in Equation (5a) capture other factors relevant to the decision to place a market 
order. The coefficient on absolute inventory, |Iit|, would likely be positive since higher inventory brings 
higher inventory risk. The influence of inventory seems likely to diminish as inventories get larger, so we 
follow Bjønnes and Rime (2005) by including squared inventory, Iit
2, to capture potential nonlinearities in 
this relationship. The absolute size of the current transaction, |Qjt|, is included because our dealer's cus-
tomer transactions are often smaller than $1 million, the minimum size for brokered trades. Since our 
dealer prefers to carry out interbank trades on EBS, a broker, rather than by dealing directly, he seems   28 
likely to collect inventory from small customer transactions and then square his position by submitting 
one relatively substantial market order. 
The results of estimating Equations (5a), shown in column one of Table VII, support our view that 
the likelihood of an outgoing interbank transaction is higher when the previous transaction is considered 
informed. Outgoing interbank transactions are statistically significantly more likely when the previous 
transaction involves a financial customer than when it involves a commercial customer. They are also 
statistically significantly more likely after relatively big trades, meaning those over €10 million.  
  The economic magnitudes of these effects can be gauged by calculating the probability of an out-
going interbank trade for different types of previous trades with other variables evaluated at sample 
means. After a moderate-sized commercial trade the estimated probability of an outgoing interbank trans-
action is 9.6 percent; after a similarly-sized financial trade that probability is roughly twice as large, at 
18.9 percent. After a commercial trade over €10 million, the probability of an outgoing interbank transac-
tion is 26.3 percent. After a similarly-sized financial trade, this probability reaches 41.6 percent.  
  Our analysis has the further implication that the likelihood of an aggressive outgoing trade is higher 
when the direction of the outgoing trade is similar to the direction of the previous incoming trade. For 
example, if the previous trade was a financial-customer purchase then the likelihood that the dealer re-
sponds aggressively is higher if the dealer is also choosing to make a purchase.
15 To capture this insight 
we run an expanded version of the regression outlined above, in which dummy variables capture whether 
the current trade has the same direction as the previous trade. One same-direction dummy applies to fi-
nancial customers (SDFC) and the other applies to commercial customers (SDCC): 
            Prob(Tradet=IB
out) = P(FCt-1, CCt-1, SDFCt-1, SDCC t-1, 10miot-1,|Iit|, Iit
2, |Qjt|) .           (5b) 
  The results of this regression, shown in column two of Table VIII, indicate as before that the likeli-
hood that the dealer makes an aggressive interbank trade rises with the likelihood that the previous trade 
was informed. As expected, they indicate that the likelihood is higher when the current trade is in the 
same direction as the previous trade, and the economic magnitude of this effect is substantial. After a 
large commercial trade the likelihood of an outgoing trade more than doubles, rising from to 22 to 56 per-
                                                            
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication.   29 
cent, if the dealer trades in the same direction; for large financial trades the likelihood also almost dou-
bles, from 32 percent to 77 percent. 
In the results from our baseline regressions, the inventory terms are statistically insignificant, 
though Bjønnes and Rime (2005) find inventories significant in related regressions. This may reflect mis-
measurement of the relevant variable, which should be the gap between actual and desired inventory ra-
ther than the level of inventory per se. To better address this issue we use our other measure of inventory, 
in which each day‟s starting value is set to zero. This modification leaves our main conclusions unaffect-
ed but inventories themselves become statistically significant. As anticipated, they have a positive and 
concave relation to the likelihood the dealer trades aggressively in the interbank market.  
Our proposed mechanism also implies that our dealer should tend to trade more aggressively after 
incoming trades by other dealers. Existing evidence suggests that our bank is likely to consider other 
banks to be better informed, on average (Bjønnes et al. (2008)). Banks of all sizes have information, but 
banks with the most customers are best informed, and our bank has a relatively modest customer base 
compared with the likes of Citibank and Deutsche Bank. To test whether our bank tends to view other 
banks as informed we include incoming interbank trades as a determinant of order aggressiveness. The 
results indicate that our bank trades more aggressively after incoming trades by other dealers than after 
commercial trades, as expected (Table VIII, column four). Other properties of the regression are unaffect-
ed. Our main conclusions are also insensitive to the inclusion of forward trades (Table VIII, column five), 
and to the exclusion of September 11, 2001 (unreported). 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the process of price discovery in FX markets. Our benchmark is the standard 
model of spread determination in equity markets, in which dealers avoid losses to their informed custom-
ers by setting an appropriate bid-ask spread. Spreads in this setting widen with the likelihood that a cus-
tomer is informed. Using the complete USD/EUR trading record of a bank in Germany over a period of 
four months, the paper first provides evidence that the spreads quoted to foreign-exchange end us-
ers/customers do not behave this way. Instead, the evidence suggests that customer spreads narrow with   30 
the likelihood that a customer is informed: customer spreads are wider for small trades than for large 
trades and are wider for the relatively uninformed commercial customers than for financial customers. 
Other implications of adverse selection are also not supported for this market. We infer that the standard 
adverse selection model does not adequately describe the price discovery process in FX. 
The paper then highlights three hypotheses from the broader microstructure literature that can help 
explain the pattern of cross-sectional variation in currency spreads. First, since dealers‟ operating costs 
are partially fixed it would be natural for spreads to be larger for small trades. The wider spreads paid by 
commercial customers cannot be explained by operating costs but could be explained in part by Green et 
al.‟s (2007) market-power hypothesis. This asserts that spreads in quote-driven markets vary positively 
with a dealer‟s transitory market power relative to a given customer, and that such market power derives 
in part from knowledge of market conditions. Commercial customers tend to know the least about current 
market conditions, so this theory predicts they pay the widest spreads, as they do. The customer-based 
variation in spreads could also reflect dealers' attempts to strategically gather information (Leach and 
Madhavan (1992), (1993), Naik et al. (1999)). Dealers may narrow spreads to attract informed customers 
and extract information from their trades, information from which the dealers can benefit in subsequent 
interdealer trades. Dealers consider financial order flow to be relatively informative, so this theory pre-
dicts that financial customers pay the narrowest spreads, as they do. 
  The final section of the paper proposes a new price discovery process that incorporates the FX 
market‟s two-tiered structure. We first note that price discovery must take place in the interdealer market, 
since customers' information is not embedded in the prices they are quoted. We suggest that after trading 
with informed customers dealers tend to make parallel outgoing interdealer trades  placing a market buy 
order after an informed customer buy, for example  in order to eliminate the likely loss-producing inven-
tory and/or to take a speculative position. In this way the information from customer trades becomes re-
flected in interdealer prices. After trading with uninformed customers, by contrast, dealers will be more 
likely to place parallel limit orders or to wait for incoming calls, leaving price relatively unaffected. 
  Our theory predicts some key stylized facts in FX, specifically the positive and substantially per-
manent relation between cumulative interdealer order flow and exchange rates as well as the positive and   31 
substantially permanent relation between financial order flow and exchange rates. Our theory also pre-
dicts that dealers are more likely to place aggressive interdealer trades after informed customer trades, and 
we provide evidence consistent with this implication. 
  Customer spreads are known to vary inversely with trade size in other liquid two-tier markets, in-
cluding the U.S. Treasury market, the U.S. corporate bond markets, and the London Stock Exchange. 
Future research could constructively investigate whether the price discovery mechanism proposed here is 
relevant in these markets.  32 
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Table I.  Descriptive statistics, currency dealing at a small bank in Germany 
A. The table shows the complete USD/EUR trading activity of a small bank in Germany, except preferred 
customer trades, over the 87 trading days between July 11




Transactions  Interbank 
Customer 
All  Financial  Commercial 
Number of Transactions 











           
       Of Which, Forward  646  114  532  60  472 
           
Value of trades (€ mil.) 











      Of Which, Forward  999  87  912  226  686 
           
Mean Size (€ mil.)  1.20  1.42  0.95  2.37  0.79 
           
    Mean Size, Forwards (€ mil.)  1.55  0.76  1.71  3.77  1.45 
 
 
B. The table shows the size distribution of all USD/EUR spot and forward transactions, except those for 
preferred customers, at a small bank in Germany over the period July 11 through November 9, 2001. 
 






Number      1,872                171              1,492 
Share        
     Below € 0.1 million   7%   15%   54% 
     € 0.1 – 0.5 million   9%  26%   32% 
     € 0.5 – 1.0 million   7%  14%    5% 
     € 1.0 – 20 million  77%  44%    8% 
     € 20 million and above   0%   1%    1% 
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Table II.  Comparison of small bank studied here with larger banks studied in other papers. 
The table shows the complete USD/EUR trading activity of a bank in Germany, except preferred customer trades, over the 87 trading days between 
July 11
th, 2001 and November 9
th, 2001. For comparison purposes we focus on statistics based exclusively on the small bank‟s spot trades.  
 
 
Bank in  
Germany 
B.I.S. (2002)  
per Bank  Lyons (1995)  Yao (1998) 







  87 Days  
in 2001
a  April 2001 
5 Days  
in 1992 
25 Days in 
1995  5 Days in 1998 
Transactions per Day  40 (51)  ---  267  181  58 - 198  198  58 
Transaction Value per Day 
(in $ millions)  39 (52)  50 - 150  1,200  1,529  142 - 443  443  270 
Value per Transaction  
   ($ millions)  1.0  ---  4.5  8.4  1.6 - 4.6  2.2  4.6 
Customer Share of 
Transaction Value (%)  23 (39)  33  0  14  0 – 18  3  18 
Average Transaction Size 
($ millions)  1.2    3.8  9.3  1.5 – 3.7  1.8  3.7 
Average Price Change 
Between Trades (pips)  11    3  5  5 - 12  5  12 
a Values in parentheses refer to the data set including outright-forward transactions.  
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Table III.  Customer order flow and exchange rates  
Table shows results from OLS regressions of the exchange-rate level on a constant, a linear trend, and 
cumulative order flow, along with associated ECM coefficients. If incoming order flow of type i is asso-
ciated with a currency appreciation, the coefficient in the cointegration regression will be positive. Johan-
sen tests with these three variables reject zero cointegrating relations and reject the existence of more than 
one cointegrating relation: regressions involving just one type of order flow are provided for comparison 
with earlier studies. The number of lags is calculated from the sample size (Newey-West automatic trun-
cation lag selection). Order flow coefficients multiplied by 10
3. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels is indicated by ‡, †, and *, respectively.  
 
  Standardized Coefficients 
Cointegrating Relation       
     Financial-Customer Order Flow  0.107  0.150*    
     Commercial-Customer Order Flow  -0.370‡    -0.301‡ 
ECM for Exchange Rate Return  -0.010‡  -0.051†  -0.120‡ 
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Table IV.  Descriptive statistics for main regression variables  
Table provides descriptive statistics for key variables used to analyze the complete USD/EUR trading 
activity of a small bank in Germany, except preferred customer trades, during the period 11
 July to 9 No-
vember, 2001. Price changes measured in pips; quantity traded (Q) and inventories measured in millions 
of euros. There are 2,859 observations. 
  Pt  ABS(Pt)  Qt  ABS(Qt)=Vt  Inventory   |Inventory|   Inventory   |Inventory|  
 Mean   0.2   10.78   0.02   1.08  -23.8   24.0  -0.02  1.25 
 Median   0.0   6.00   0.04   0.35  -20.2   20.3  -0.04  0.44 
 Maximum   99.7   99.7   76.4   76.4   32.8   84.0  76.32  76.43 
 Minimum  -91.0   0.00  -76.3   0.01  -84.0   0.00  -76.43  0.00 
 Std. Dev.   17.3   13.6   3.5   3.33   15.6   15.2  3.64  3.41 
 Skewness   0.07   2.09   0.6   13.0  -0.19   0.32  -0.38  12.0 
 Kurtosis   7.43   8.94   206   234   2.27   1.93  177  209 
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Table V.  Huang and Stoll (1997) model  










1 1 . 
Pit is the change in price between two successive customer trades measured in pips. Dt is +1 for buy-initiated trades 
and –1 for sell-initiated trades. Iit is the dealer's inventory, measured in EUR millions. These variables are interacted 
with dummy variables for trades with financial customers (FC) and trades with commercial customers (CC). They 
are also interacted with dummies for trade size: Lg. = {|Qjt|  [1,)}; Md. = {|Qjt|  [0.5,1)}; Sm. = {|Qjt|  (0,0.5)}. 
Data include all incoming USD/EUR spot and forward trades of a small bank in Germany, except those with pre-
ferred customers, over the period July 11, 2001, through November 9, 2001. Estimation uses GMM and Newey-
West correction. Significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. Constant term sup-
pressed. Estimates of the baseline half spread are highlighted in bold. 
  Baseline Regression  Robustness Tests 
 
Coefficient  Std. Error  Inventory 





Half-Spread, S/2           
     S/2 x FC x Sm.  10.76‡  2.30  10.54‡     7.93‡    7.66‡ 
     S/2 x FC x Md.   5.35*  2.41   5.35†    4.00*  -5.46 
     S/2 x FC x Lg.   3.41*  1.95   4.20†  4.93‡  2.09 
     S/2 x CC x Sm.  13.46‡  0.61  13.48‡  11.98‡  11.38‡ 
     S/2 x CC x Md.  11.21‡  2.60  11.62‡  12.46‡  16.12‡ 
     S/2 x CC x Lg.   2.11  1.54   3.80†    5.44‡    5.34† 
     S/2 x IB x Sm.+ Md.        -0.97   
     S/2 x IB x Lg.          2.11‡   
Adverse Selection            
  x FC x Sm.  0.39  0.20  0.32     0.45†   0.48 
  x FC x Md.   0.33  0.65  0.46    0.49     1.74* 
  x FC x Lg.  0.19  0.74  0.27      0.65*  -1.14 
  x CC x Sm.   0.03  0.03    0.06†     0.12‡      0.20‡ 
  x CC x Md.    0.35*  0.19    0.39†     0.35†      0.69‡ 
  x CC x Lg.  0.51  0.81  0.51   0.34    0.30 
  x IB x Sm.+ Md.         0.03   
  x IB x Lg.           0.58†   
Inventory           
  x FC x Sm.   0.10  0.17   0.04   0.02    0.21 
  x FC x Md.  -1.00  0.71  -0.51  -0.65    0.82 
  x FC x Lg.    0.01  0.06   0.00  -0.01   -0.21 
  x CC x Sm.   -0.05  0.04   -0.08*  -0.05    0.01 
  x CC x Md.   0.08  0.29   0.08   0.06    0.05 
  x CC x Lg.   0.01  0.05  -0.01  -0.02    0.07 
  x IB x Sm +Md.         0.70   
  x IB x Lg.        -0.06   
Adjusted R
2  0.34  0.33  0.25  0.34 
Observations  1,644  1,651  2,857  1,131 
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Table VI.  Madhavan-Smidt (1991) model  
We estimate this equation:  Pit =  +1Dt + 2Dt-1 + 1Iit + 2Iit-1 + Qjt + t. 
The dependent variable is the change in price between two successive incoming trades, measured in pips. Dt is an 
indicator variable picking up the direction of the deal, positive for purchases (at the ask) and negative for sales (at 
the bid); Iit is the dealer's inventory at time t, and Qjt is order flow measured in millions of euros. These variables are 
interacted with dummy variables for financial customers (FC) and commercial customers (CC). They are also inter-
acted with dummies for trade size: Lg. = {Qjt  [1,)}; Md. = {Qjt  [0.5,1)}; Sm. = {Qjt  (0,0.5)}. Data include all 
incoming customer USD/EUR spot and forward trades of a small bank in Germany, except those with preferred 
customers, over the period July 11, 2001, through November 9, 2001. Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West cor-
rection. Significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. Estimates of the (negative of 
the) baseline half spread are highlighted in bold. 
 
  Baseline Regression  Robustness Tests 






Constant  0.14  0.49  0.03  0.028  0.33 
Direction           
     FC x Sm x Dt. 











  FC x Md. x Dt 











  FC x Lg. x Dt 











  CC  x Sm. x Dt 











     CC x Md. x Dt 
  CC x Md. x Dt-1 
 10.82‡ 
  -5.73‡ 
 1.49 






  -5.29‡ 
  CC x Lg. x Dt 











  IB x Md.+Sm.x Dt 
  IB x Md.+Sm.x Dt-1 
      -0.96 
 -0.01 
 
  IB x Lg. x Dt 
  IB x Lg. x Dt-1 
      2.22‡ 
 -0.88* 
 
Inventory            
  FC x Iit   











  CC x Iit  











     IB x Iit  
  IB x Iit-1 
      0.01 
0.00 
 
Trade size           
  FC x Qjt   -0.60  0.52  0.12   -0.41   0.10 
  CC x Qjt    0.52   0.43   0.77*   0.53  -0.13 
     IB x Qjt        -0.18   
Adjusted R
2  0.32  0.33  0.33  0.35 
Observations  1,644  1,651  2,857  1,131 
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Table VII.  Glosten-Harris (1988) Model  
We estimate this model:  Pt = c0(Dt – Dt-1) + c1(DtVt – Dt-1Vt-1) + zDtVt + t. 
The dependent variable is the change in price between two successive incoming trades, measured in pips. 
Dt is an indicator variable picking up the direction of the deal, positive for purchases (at the ask) and neg-
ative for sales (at the bid); Vjt is the absolute value of order flow measured in millions of euros. These 
variables are interacted with dummy variables for financial customers (FC) and commercial customers 
(CC) and other banks (IB). Data include all incoming regular-sized customer USD/EUR spot and forward 
trades of a small bank in Germany, except those with preferred customers, over the period July 11, 2001, 
through November 9, 2001. Estimation uses GMM with Newey-West standard errors. Significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively.  
 
  Baseline Regression  Robustness Tests 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Interbank Trades 
Included  Spot Trades Only 
Transitory spread component c0         
  (CCt*Dt –CCt-1*Dt-1)  10.79‡  0.54  10.77‡  7.43‡ 
  (FCt*Dt –FCt-1*Dt-1)  5.12‡  1.17  4.92‡  5.64‡ 
  (IBt*Dt –IBt-1*Dt-1)      0.39   
         
Volume coefficient c1         
  (CCt*Vjt*Dt –CCt-1*Vjt-1*Dt-1)   -0.32‡  0.12  -0.29‡  -0.71† 
  (FCt*Vjt*Dt –FCt-1*Vjt-1*Dt-1)  -0.46‡  0.13  -0.33‡  -0.15* 
  (IBt*Vjt*Dt –IBt-1*Vjt-1*Dt-1)      0.23   
         
Adverse-selection component z         
  CC*Dt*Vjt  -0.18  0.16  -0.22  0.33 
  FC*Dt*Vjt  0.24  0.23  0.15  0.33 
  IB*Dt*Vjt      0.19   
         
Adjusted R
2  0.33  0.24  0.06 
Observations  1,645  2,853  1,129  
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Table VIII.  Probit regression of choice of outgoing interbank trades 
We estimate this equation, Prob(Tradet=IB
out) = P(FCt-1, CCt-1, SDFCt-1, SDCC t-1, 10miot-1,|Iit|, Iit
2, |Qjt|), 
as a probit regression. Incoming (outgoing) interbank trades are coded 0 (1). FCt-1 is a dummy coded one 
if the previous counterparty was a financial customer, CCt-1 and IBt-1 are defined similarly for commercial 
customers and other banks. SDFC (SDCC) is a dummy coded one if the current dealer trade has the same 
direction as the previous financial-customer (commercial-customer) trade. 10 miot-1 is a dummy coded 
one if the size of the previous transaction was €10 million or larger. I represents inventories, in millions of 
euros; |Qjt| represents the absolute size of the current deal, measured in EUR millions; Significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. 
  
  Baseline Regressions  Robustness Tests 











   FCt-1  -0.115   -0.441‡  -0.441‡  -0.588‡  -0.408† 
   CCt-1    -0.537‡   -0.754‡  -0.748‡  -0.901‡  -0.621‡ 
   SameDirection FC      1.221‡   1.219‡    1.221‡    1.108‡ 
   Same Direction CC      0.928‡    0.930‡    0.928‡    1.065‡ 
   10 miot-1    0.668‡    0.736‡    0.719‡   0.740‡    0.450‡ 
   IBt-1        -0.223‡   
   |Iit|  -5.28 E-3  -0.005   0.031‡  -4.4E-3  -5.03E-3 
   Iit
2   9.19 E-5  8.40E-5  -0.001‡  7.55E-5     9.76E-5 
   |Qjt|    0.024‡     0.025‡   0.029‡   0.024‡   0.014 
   Constant  -0.740‡    -0.741‡   -0.879‡  -0.600‡  -0.938‡ 
McFadden's R
2  0.038   0.069   0.072  0.072  0.084 
Observations  3,534  3,534  3,534  3,534  2,894 
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Figure 1:  Intraday distribution of trades 
The charts below show the average number of trades during each five-minute period of the trading day. 
Data come from a small bank in Germany and include all USD/EUR spot and forward trades during four 
months in 2001.  
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